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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the organization of certain 
Chinese shipping (and trading) enterprises in an attempt to throw some light 
on their compatibility to change and modernization, as compared with some 
Japanese counterparts. 
The shipping industry has been selected because it is of key importance 
as a potential force in changing a feudalistic economy threatened with 
modern competition towards an integrated national economy capable of 
meeting this threat. An efficient shipping industry able to move goods cheap-
ly and rapidly can stimulate industrial specialization and aid in developing 
both national and international trade. Such a modern shipping industry 
was achieved in Meiji Japan. We will try to see whether conditions of " pre-
modern" shipping in both countries have been of assistance to modernization. 
It is impossible in one article to cover the many aspects of the problem, 
so only certain examples will be given in hopes that they will be suggestive 
and indicative of the general patterns. For China, we will outline the native 
"junk" shipping and trading enterprises up to 1943, and the one important 
Chinese attempt at organization of a modern steamship line, the Chinese 
Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, from its inception in 1872 to its 
nationalization in 1932. This should afford a general view of Chinese ship-
ping enterprise for this period. 
For Japan, we will examine the organization during the Tokugawa period 
of shipping enterprises in the Osaka ~Edo trade from 1624, when regular runs 
were instituted. Shipping between Osaka and Edo was the most important 
throughout the Tokugawa period, but there was also a very important in-
crease in provincial trade and shipping and the rise of wealthy provincial 
merchants, especially in the late Tokugawa period. As an example of this 
>It Fulbright Scholar and Ford Foundation Fellow at Kyoto University. 
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phenomenon, we have selected the career of Zenrya Gohei ~mn.$<1ili, 1773-
1852, 
2. JAPAN 
Due to the mountainous topography of Japan, cven the major rivers are 
navigable for comparatively short distances only, and shipping by water is 
m:linly by sea, During the Ashikaga period, sea-going vessels were used more 
for military and piratical purposes than for legitimate trade, and domestic 
trade was on a low level due to feudal localism and economic self-sufficiency. 
After Hideyoshi's defeat of Shimazu in Kyushu in 1587, he prohibited pirate 
activities, and pirates disappeared, not to reappear in Japanese waters.') The 
restoration of peace saw a great development of overseas trade by Japanese 
merchant ships, but this vigorous activity was dealt a death blow by the 
exclusion edicts of 1638 which prohibited the building of ships of more than 
500 koku (about 2,500 bushels) capacity, for the purpose of preventing ocean 
voyages.') Economic energies were then concentrated in domestic trade. 
Under the" pax Tokugawa," with its building of Edo into a populous, 
largely nonproductive metropolis, the exploitation of mines in Tokugawa terri-
tories and the standardization of the currency, the Tokugawa territories (which 
included the major cities) were drawn together economically, and with the 
regular institution in 1634 of the Sankin Kiitai system of alternate residence 
in Edo for all daimyii, the daimyo were drawn into the developing national 
economy. The economic history of the period is one of change from feudal 
localism and self-sufficiency to an interdependent money economy and the 
parallel rise of commercial capital and the merchant class. 
Both sea and land transportation experienced great improvements in 
methods, facilities and safety, during the Tokugawa period.') At the begin-
ning of the period, however, with small boats hugging the dangerous coast-
line, without charts and without marine insurance, shipping was a hazardous 
business, but profits were extremely good for boat captains who were both 
skillful and lucky, as reflected in a common saying of the time, "A boat 
c~ptain three years, and a secure future." 4) 
1) Honja Eijira ;;j>:.a:'iitYi1N~, ed., Nihon Keizaishi Jiten a;;j>:.~Ii\'JaIlil'!JIl. [Dictionary of Japanese 
Economic History] (Tokyo: 1939),210. 
2) George Sansom, Japan, a Short Cultural History (Kew York: 1943 ed.), 452; Sansom, The 
Western World and Japan (New York: 1950), 177. 
3) cr. Horie Yasuz6 .t1iIiX-i*i'!, dTokugawaJidai no Rikujo Kotsii ;f!!\)ll*~O) RE:xxii." [Over-
land Transportation in the Tokugawa Period], Kei~aishi Kenkyu ~!!~Ji!Wf~, XI, 2 (Feb. 1934), 
73-86. 
4) Akabori KyujinS m,.#iiI!A1x.~~, "Tokugawa Jidai no Sh5nin ~)lll$fkCT)rJ:jA ". [Merchants 
of the Tokugawa Period], in ,NihQn Shonin Shi g::¥-r;fjAjI! [A History of Japanese Merchants] 
(Tokyo: 1935), 203. . 
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The trade between Edo and Osaka, the great collection and distribution 
center popularly called the" kitchen" of Japan, was predominant through-
out the Tokugawa period, but most strikingly so up to about 1750. The size 
of the boats participating in this trade during the early years of the period 
ranged from 200 to 400 koku capacity. A company called the Higaki Kaisen 
'1ltml@~1l' was organized among successful boat captains and began offering 
shipping services in regularly scheduled runs in 1624.") Business increased, 
but losses for the owners of goods were high, due to market price fluctua-
tions, damage and shipwreck settlements, and dishonesty of boat captains. 
Therefore, in 1694, a guild of owners of shipped goods was organized in Osaka 
with 24 member companies and at the same time in Edo with 10 member 
companies (called the T6kumi TWiI.. ten companies) which federated with the 
Osaka organization and supervised all settlements of losses, distributing them 
equally among the members. The number of member companies in Edo 
increased to 22 by 1716. Federation was facilitated by the fact that many 
of the Edo organizations were begun as branches by Osaka merchants, and 
the result was a type of cooperative marine insurance. With this protection, 
the shipping business flourished.·) In addition, this made possible a close 
liaison which precluded the possibility of dishonesty on the part of boat 
captains, but it may well be asked what reason there was for the shipping 
company and their captains to provide safe, efficient and speedy service when 
the responsibility for loss to goods had been assumed by the owners. The 
answer was the development of the "bansen" 1lf.1iil' which will be described 
later. The problem of fluctuating market prices was dealt with by a mono-
polistic regulation of supply through the "bansen" system. 
In time, the exclusion edict was relaxed to permit coastwise boats up 
to 1,000 koku capacity, and the Higaki Kaisen, as well as other shippers, built 
many vessels with capacities up to 1,000 koku.7) The company owned 160 
boats in the 1770's, and specialized in the shipment of cotton, cotton tex-
tiles, oil, paper, medicines, sugar, iron, wax, and dried bonito, holding con-
tracts with monopolistic organizations in Osaka and Edo which handled these 
commodities.8) One authority describes the organization of this company as 
5) Nihon Keizaishi Jiten, op. cit., 1360. 
6) Ibid. A more detailed treatment may be found in Honjo Eijiro, ed., Nihon K6tsu Ski no 
Kenkyu a:<l<X:iilill'.")ilf9i: [Studies in the History of Japanese Transportation] (Tokyo: 1929), 
14-20. 
7) Akabori, op. cit., 202; Nihon Keizaishi Jiten (henceforth NK]), 1360. Ko date is given for 
this change in policy. 
8) NKJ, 142. For the shipping of tax rice, bids covering whole provinces were received by 
the a~thoritie~ from contractors ",:ho hired private boat~ belonging to either mer~hants or 
captaIns. FreIght charges were paId on delivery of the nee, and elaborate regulauons pro-
vided. for every possible contingent. Cf. John Henry Wigmore, ed., "Materials for the Study 
of Pnvate Law In Old Japan," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, xx (1892), Supple-
ment I, Introduction, Pp. 1-203. On tax rice, 182-6. 
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"similar to the present-day Nippon Yusen Kaisha [N. Y. K. Lines]," and adds, 
"There was no trouble about trans-shipment due to the long term loading 
contracts with the owners of the goods." 9) 
Saki was a commodity of great importance to all classes in Edo, whether 
fun-loving merchant, artisan or leisure class samurai. It was shipped in casks 
(taru :t@:) from Osaka in the boats of the Higaki Kaisen until 1730, when the 
saki dealers broke away and formed their own shipping company, called the 
Taru Kaisen :t@:MIDJilfi. which competed with the Higaki Kaisen, at first carrying 
only saki, but then adding other commodities. In 1772, however, the two 
companies amalgamated, agreeing to fix the number of shares and to con-
tinue operating under their own names. to) At this time the Taru Kaisen owned 
106 boats, making a total of 266 boats among them.l1) Rates for shipment 
of saki from Osaka to Edo were quoted year by year.l2) 
In the early days of the Higaki Kaisen, there was a great demand for 
saki, cotton and cotton textiles in Edo, largely unfulfilled until the new crop 
was harvested each year. It was difficult for producers in the Osaka area to 
meet the demand, and the result was that some produced inferior products 
in their haste to beat their competitors to the Edo market with the first 
cotton textiles or saki of the season. This was unsatisfactory to all, because 
hastily made goods of poor quality had the initial advantage, and the bulk 
of the production was dumped on the Edo market within a short period of 
time, with a resultant lowering of prices. There was also an overburdening 
of boat facilities during the rush periods. Therefore, the major producers 
decided to cooperate for mutual advantage. When the crops were in, an 
agreement was made which fixed an adequate amount of time for production, 
alloted to each producer a certain number of boats of similar size and type, 
and set a day and hour for the first fleet of the season to set sail from Nishi 
no Miya harbor, near Osaka. There was great interest in the race. I t took 
about three days and nights for the fastest boats, with favorable winds, to go 
the distance of some 400 miles. The first boat to reach Uraga was given a 
plaque inscribed with date and numbered "first boat" (ichi ban sen -:moJilfi). 
The next boats to come in were numbered, in order, second, third, etc. All 
9) Akabori, op. cit., 202. 
10) NK], 1360. 
11) Ibid., 112. 
12) Wada Atsunori f~ 9l:l1l;~, .. Bansen to Sei'hu Torihiki no Kanrei 'lIfJlll ~ 1Wi'IliJl;(ili ",!1!tj?lJ" 
[The Customs of Bansen and Transactions in Refined Sake], in Honjo EijiroJ ed., .Nihon Ko-
tsil Shi no Kenkyil, op. cit., 433-4. Available records show a gradual rise from 1726, almost 
doubling by 1235. 1726 and 1835 are the first and last dates available. The r'ise Was from 
15 to 82 mommc silver per horse load (about 300 lbs.), but this rise may have been largely 
a function of inflated currency. 
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boats in such races were therefore called "hansen." The owners of the first 
boat's cargo benefited, as Edo purchasers paid a premium for "first goods." 
The winning boat captain was presented with a haori ~~~ (a silk cloak) and 
a bonus, but, most important, he gained such prestige that he never had to 
worry about customers to load his boat with goods. As a matter of fact, 
there was such competition among owners of goods to secure the services of 
the boats and captains with the best records that the shipping companies 
had to limit the size of their cargoes. The number of boats in each race 
varied from five to fifteen, and the races were carefully spaced to avoid the 
disadvantages of any oversupply in Edo. This was the hansen system, which 
proved so satisfactory for cotton and saki to both shippers and owners of 
goods that it came into quite general use, and in 1847, both the major 
companies put all their boats on the hansen system, no matter what the 
goods to be shipped.13) 
There were cases where the shipping companies were not simply shippers. 
In the case of saki, the producers did not maintain an agent in Edo, and 
relied upon the Taru Kaisen to sell the saki for a commission in addition to 
the regular shipping fees. Wada says, "The Edo sake trade from the first 
was a commission trade carried on simply by trust. This commission trade 
did not escape certain defects, but it cannot be overlooked that it achieved 
a major and effective role during this period. It is perhaps enough to know 
how far trade had progressed, by realizing that already at this time such a 
large commercial enterprise was carried out on the basis of trust." U) 
The hansen system served to develop highly skilled boat captains and 
crews with considerable pride in their efficiency. Safety of their boats was 
in their own and their company's interest, and safety of the goods shipped 
part of their pride in their efficiency. Speed, of course, was a basic ingredi-
ent of the system. The system persisted well into the Meiji period, when the 
old companies were gradually replaced by the steamers of such modern com-
panies as Mitsubishi and Mitsui. It" provided for co-existence and mutual 
benefit, and was a good solution to problems of the time." 15) 
Official connections with trade were generally of two types in Toku-
gawa Japan. The first, and traditional one, was based on a policy of res-
training the development of the money economy. This policy gave reason 
13) This account is condensed from Wada, Ope cit., 420-29. He has found documentary evi-
dence of the existence of the hansen system in 1738, but it actually was in existence quite 
a number of years before that date~ he says. Ihid.~ 420. Documentary evidence is frag-
mentary, but at least as early as 1809 owners of goods could obtain hansen shipment of their 
goods for an added fee of I momme per horse load. 
14) Ibid., 447-8. 
15) Ibid., 447. 
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for the enforcement of contributions in the form of "thank money," gifts 
and forced loans from merchants usually in compensation for monopoly 
rights, and occasional confiscation of merchant wealth as punishment for 
conspicuous extravagance on the part of merchants.") It was the policy of 
the bakufu and of many of the less progressive daimyo. The other type of 
connection was new in the Tokugawa period, and was created by the attempt 
of some daimyo, particularly of the tozama (" outside") daimyo, to utilize the 
developing money economy.17) This was done by the formation of alliances 
with merchants to monopolize certain specialty products within the han, 
mostly for export to other han in order to bring in needed currency. Of some 
260 han, at least 60 carried on official monopolies of some type.18) This 
development sprang from the necessity of daimyo to sell in Osaka, the central 
market, their surplus tax rice and other products collected as taxes. They 
b llilt warehouses in Osaka to be able to sell when prices were high, and 
some realized that profits could be made by having their" protected mer-
chants" (goyo shOnin 1l\lJlllfllA) buy other products within the han to be sold 
in Osaka. It was natural that such daimyo would use their political power 
to establish monopolies within their territories of such products as salt, paper, 
wax, textiles and food products. So long as these monopolies yielded a good 
return to the daimyo, the officials left all the details to the protected mer-
chants, who exploited in their own interest their far greater knowledge of 
trade, while taking care not to invoke official rage and arbitrary exactions.") 
In order to move their rice and other goods to Osaka and Edo, daimyo 
used both privately owned boats and their own "official" vessels. The 
latter provided them with both regular and emergency means of travel, and 
were ostensibly for military purposes, but "behind the scenes" they were 
used as instruments of commerce. Akabori adds that" It is needless to say 
that the merchants engaged in this protected business did not miss the op-
portunity to profit by it." 20) The rise of provincial merchants which is a 
striking feature of the middle Tokugawa period onward was generally, but 
not entirely, within the feudal framework.") The pattern of this rise is some-
16) Horie Yasuzo, "An Outline of Economic Policy in the Tokugawa Period," Kyoto Univer-
sity Economic Review (henceforth, lo.'VER), 15, 4 (Oct. 1940), 58. 
17) Ibid. 
18) Rorie Yasuzo, "Clan Monopoly Policy in the Tokugawa Period," KUER 17, I (Jan. 1942), 
31. 
19) Ibid., 31-52. 
20) Akahori, op. cit., 203. 
21) Endo Masao illi.lli:iEJjj, "Zeniya Gohei no Kaga Ryonai Rosoku-za Appaku Jiken IiJ!IlDi 
*!I!i"'~~1'1~fll,lll,:tliiJll';l!II1j§1l>#- [The Incident of Zeniya Gohei's Pressure on the Candle Guild 
within the Territory of Kaga], Keil!.oishi Kenkyil iliKil'Ill!liJ'f::t 46 (Aug. 1933), 38-54; 47 (Sept. 
1933), 162-174; 49 (Nov. 1933),286-302. 
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what similar to that already seen in the shipping companies of Osaka. In 
response to new economic conditions, small merchants began individual enter-
prises, but as trade became more regularized and as they grew and became 
more successful, the tendency was to find security and more regular profits 
in cooperative monopolistic organization. However, there were cases where 
individual enterprisers were able to build up their own organizations with 
their own increasing capital, competing successfully with other merchants and 
entrenched monopolists, to find themselves in a position where they could 
seek official protection only where it was to their benefit, leaving other activi-
ties relatively free of official connections. The rise of this type of provincial 
merchant is admirably demonstrated in the career of Zeniya Gohei ~~li~oo. 
Zeniya Gohei (1773-1852) was born in Miyakoshi, a port town in Kaga, 
the largest single han in Japan, under the powerful and conservative daimyo 
family of Maeda, and he made Miyakoshi the headquarters for all his far-
flung commercial activities.") Gohei's father alternated between, and sometimes 
combined, a small shipping business, a money exchange and a usury busi-
ness. However, in his later years the family fortunes were at a very low ebb, 
and he abandoned the shipping business which he found full of dangers and 
losses.") 
In accordance with his father's desires, Gohei operated a pawn shop 
and a second hand dry goods store, and also dealt in soy sauce and timber 
until he was 39, when his father died.") The next thirty years saw an un-
precedented commercial expansion from these humble beginnings. 
Gohei was untraditional in not following his father's advice against new 
enterprises. It was usual to hold fast to the ancestral business and to avoid 
innovations. Family constitutions of rich merchants of the period often con-
tain such phrases as: "Nothing other than the traditional business will be 
engaged in," "It is prohibited to change the business," "Continue without 
change." ") Zeniya not only went into shipping, but he seems to have inter-
22) NK], 916-7 has a good short summary of Zeniya's career, but has Zeniya embarking on 
the Hokkaido trade at age 17, whereas he was actually 40. 
23) Ibid., 916. 
24) ShOfii Katei ,*Ili\l%%, Zeniya Gohei Shinden !fiI! .. nCJHtiiJ(ilJ [A True Biography of Zeniya 
Gohei] (Kyoto: 1930), 43, 51. It is much less of a biography than a criticism of all previ~ 
ous biographies, with long quotations from correspondence and other documents, all in soro-
bun (which is, ShoW admits, filled with errors and ambiguities). Honjo, in his bibliography 
of economic history (.Nihon Keizaishi Bunken) says: "This work is based on contemporary 
documents secretly stored by Zeniya's descendants. It attempts to correct and supplement 
the many 'Writings on Zeniya Gohei, and should clarify the conditions of trade of the time." 
(Tokyo: 1933), 163. 
25) HorieYasuzo, "The Life Structure of the Japanese People in its Historical Aspects," KUER, 
XXI, 1 (April 1951), 3. 
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ested himself in any project which had some promise of profits. 
It was somewhat by chance that Zeniya entered the shipping business. 
In 1813, when he was 40, three small boats were forfeited to his pawn shop. 
They had belonged to a pioneer in the Hokkaido (at that time called Yezo) 
trade, and, armed with information from him and probably also from the 
writings of Honda Toshiaki and other "Dutch scholars" who were interest-
ed in expansion northward, Zeniya himself made the dangerous trip to 
Matsumae with a cargo of rice and returned to Miyakoshi with edible sea-
weed and dried herring, on which he realized a considerable profit.'·) Gradu-
ally he expanded his business by these means, dispatching boats from 
Miyakoshi not only north to Hokkaido but south to Kyiishii, and to the 
Osaka area. He established no less than 34 branch warehouses and stores 
in the key harbors, made contracts with the great commercial houses of 
Osaka and Edo, and arranged for reputable and successful merchants in 
other places to be his agents, on long term contracts. 27) 
As a shipper beginning with three small boats, he became an important 
boat owner, eventually building some of his own boats. His fleet reached 
a total of 13 vessels of between 1,000 and 2,500 koku capacity, and some 
11 0 of 1,000 koku capacity and less. Adding to this the small boats he 
maintained in various ports, "there is no knowing how many hundreds of 
boats he operated." 28) They ranged regularly as far as the Miyake and 
Hachijo Islands in the south and Etorofu in the Kuriles, and there are many 
stories of his boats "drifting," in happy compliance with unseasonable winds 
and in violation of the bakufu prohibitions, to Korea, China, the south sea 
islands, and even to America.") The last story has been proven to be the 
fabrication of one of Zeniya's captains who expanded a trading trip to Korea 
into a great and plausible story of adventure in America,'"' but the accepted 
authority on Zeniya's life concludes that his boats did" drift" as far as the 
26) ShafU, op. cit., 51-2; NKJ 916. See Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 
London: 1952) 76, which is at variance in every detail from his source, Honj6's introduction 
to the collection of Honda's writings, Honda Toshiaki Shu (Tokyo: 1935), 9. 
27) ShafU, 83-5. This type of commercial expansion was not unusual in his time, and his 
success was nearly paralleled by such men as Kong6ya Jirobei ~!fi!lIJ.m.iX~~*1fj of Echizen, 
with whom Zeniya had close connections and with whom he cooperated on many transac-
tions. Kong6ya attempted to help Zeniya when he got in trouble at the end of his life 
with the Kaga authorities. Ibid., 84. Kong6ya Was a samurai turned merchant, like 
the first Mitsui to renounce his higher status to enter a commercial career early in the 
Tokugawa period. Cf. Th, Houu of Mitsui (Tokyo: 1937), 4. 
28) Ibid., 83. His building of boats over the 1,000 koku legal limit will be accounted for 
later. 
29) Ibid., 83, 138. 
30) Ibid., 138. 
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south sea islands.") 
Zeniya's boats plied an illegal but profitable foreign trade on a regular 
basis both in the islands of the Satsunan·shoto south of Kagoshima and in 
the region of Etorofu in the Kuriles.32) It was a secret trade, but had the 
tacit approval of the Maeda family.") It was begun in the north when one 
day one of Zeniya's boats encountered a very large ship off Etorofu 'and, 
screwing up courage, the boat operator approached it. Only after the J apa-
nese captain went aboard and conferred with the foreign captain did he know 
it was a Russian trading ship. He made arrangements for regular meetings 
at sea for the purposes of trade, and Zeniya profited greatly from it. This 
was in 1825.") 
Zeniya's precise relationship with the Maeda house must remain some-
what of a mystery, but it appears that he was considered a protected mer-
chant only in some of his activities, such as in trading monopolies in specific 
types of goods within the han. ShOfu, his latest biographer, emphasizes 
several times that his greatest activity as a shipper-trader was before he came 
under Maeda protection, and that his boats came under official protection 
only when Zeniya was 67 years of age.") When Zeniya was 54, he began 
building his own boats to add to his already large fleet. 36) Ten years later, 
in 1837, the Kaga treasury was empty, and several prominent merchants, 
including the irrepressible Zeniya, were summoned to an audience with han 
officials, all expecting notice of forced loans. Before seating himself, Zeniya 
came forward and said with proper humility that he had not consulted the 
others, but was willing to provide 100,000 ryo m himself if one request were 
granted. The officials were much surprised at such magnificent beneficence, 
and the presiding official inquired what the request was. The conversation 
went something like this: 





"Oh, what a strange request! How large?" 
"I have eight or nine ships of 1,900 koku capacity, but what 
a chanin finds very difficult to obtain are ships of 2,000 koku 
and more. For this I would like to borrow your influence." 
31) ShOfii, 139. 
32) NK], 916; ShOfil, 83. Sources do not indicate with whom he traded in the south, but 
probably it was with Ryukyu-ans and perhaps Chinese. 
33) ShOm, op. cit., 138. 
34) Ibid., 83, 90, 97. 
35) Ibid., 48, 51. 
36) Ibid., 51. 
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Presiding 
official: "If so, how many wou ld you build?" 
Zeniya: "At first, two. Two would be quite sufficient." 
Thus, he was given permlSSlOn to build large ships which would nomi-
nally belong to the daimyo of Kaga but which were in fact the property 
of Zeniya. He built one of 2,500 koku capacity, at a cost of 2,000 ryo, in 
Osaka, and onc of 2,000 koku capacity in Miyakoshi, marked as official ships 
of the daimyo and able to sail anywhcre.37 ) It is interesting to note that 
the bakuju, which controlled Osaka, did nothing to prevent the construction 
of a ship 2?{ times the legal limit in size. ' 
Soon after Zeniya received permission to build these large ships, all his 
boats were placed "at the service of, and under the protection of, the dai-
myo."") Zeniya's resourcefulness was apparent to the Kaga authorities, 
they treated him with care, and "to a certain extent" had Zeniya act for 
them,") but Zeniya did not take undue advantage of this protection, and 
the Maeda kept secret Zeniya's association with them in most things.") 
Information is similarly scanty in regard to Zeniya's methods of organiza-
tion and operation, and many questions must go unanswered, such as how 
he paid his ship captains and agents scattered throughout Japan. Their 
correspondence with Zeniya is voluminous, and extracts from it make up 
most of Shoril's book, but it leaves much unsaid. It has a conspiratorial 
tone, and the poor sorobun in which it is written is not conducive to preci-
sion. However, some of the descriptions of the actual trading are very 
detailed, filled with statistics and frank enough to describe, for instance, the 
illegal trade with the Russians. Zeniya must have trusted his men, and the 
fact that he accumulated such unprecedented capital would suggest that his 
trust was not misplaced. In Miyakoshi, he carried on his usury business 
and directed his multifarious trading activities. He had close relations with 
other merchants and often shipped their goods for them, and no doubt 
37) Sham, 49-50, 64. The conversation is from a historical novel, Zeniya Gohei, by Watanabe 
Katei 1Jlm.~, which is generally far from accurate, but this story has been documented, 
according to Shom. The ship built in Miyakoshi aroused such interest that people came 
for miles to see it. Characteristically, Zeniya postponed launching for four months, built 
no less than 54 temporary tea houses for visitors in the immediate vicinity, and charged a 
small fee to inspect the ship. Unfortunately, it was blown up on a reef and broken in two 
during a typhoon in 1848. Ibid., 75, 51. 
38) Ibid" 118. 
39) Ibid., 117. 
40) Ibid. In 1728, at the age of 55, Zeniya went into nominal retirement (as his father had 
when Gohei was 17) and let his three sons handle the details of the business, b,ut continued 
to direct activities from a small and quiet village near MiyakoJhi. Ibid., 85. 
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participated In the contract business of shipping tax rice, but his fleet was 
mainly used in his own trading operations. In his branch warehouses and 
stores he laid in large stocks of paper, cotton and silk goods, raw silk, wax, 
candles, sugar, salt, honey, rice, and innumerable other items. H) These 
goods were purchased throughout Japan, but particularly in Osaka and Chil-
goku (the southwest area of Hom-/.u). In Hokkaido his principle purchases 
were dried herring, seaweed and soybeans, and in Kyilshii his major purchase 
was lumber.") 
Zeniya's great wealth was not attained without treading on a number 
of toes. There were two major merchant families in Kaga who were well 
established before him and whom he soon outstripped. However, although 
a "nouveau Tiche ", he seems to have remained on fairly good terms with 
them, mainly by dealing them in on some of his schemes.") But his activi-
ties were bound to bring him into conflict with the established monopolists. 
The Maeda were conservatives in economic policy, and followed bakufu policy 
in regard to monopolies. One of the traditional Kaga monopolies was the 
candle guild (Rosokuza ji.ijj~), with 29 shareholding members and headquar-
ters in Kanazawa. It held a long-standing monopoly of sale (at very high 
prices) for Kaga and the two neighboring provinces of Noto and Etsu. Ze-
niya had a flourishing trade with Aizu, north of Edo, where candles were 
a major product, and in the 1820's his stocks of candles were piling up while 
he looked feverishly for new outlets. He decided to use his influence with 
the han authorities to break into the candle markets closest to home.") 
Zeniya first memorialized the han authorities, explaining that he had a 
large stock of Aizu candles which were much superior in quality and lower 
in price than those of the Kanazawa candle guild. Therefore, he proposed 
to sell Aizu candles at a low price, bringing in new stocks with his own 
boats and remitting "the larger part of the profits" to the han as a volun-
tary contribution.") He justified it as being in the interest of the majority 
of the people as well as a benefit to the han finances, and added that at a 
private discussion with the members of the candle guild, he had urged them 
to handle his Aizu candles, but" on one pretext or another" they had turned 
a deaf ear.") This refusal is understandable because the guild's own product 
41) ShOfU, 98. 
42) Ibid., 97-8. Zeniya followed a Common practice of charging higher prices of samurai. 
Ibid., 84 
43) NK], 916-7. 
44) End6, op. cit., 79. 
45) Ibid., 165. 
46) Ibid., 165.6. 
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could not possibly compete with the low-priced Aizu candles. <7) Zeniya then 
asked the authorities to constitute him as a special guild, to share the market 
with the existing guild, no doubt knowing that this would cause the eventual 
failure of the guild.") 
Zeniya's proposal was well calculated to interest the han authorities who 
in the 1820's were having grave financial troubles. However, they decided 
to let the candle guild have a hearing.") The guild members insisted that 
Zeniya had made unfair and inaccurate statements due to his own greed, 
and they presented a spirited defense of the high price of candles in Kaga 
in terms of costs which Zeniya had omitted from his detailed memorial, 
pointing out the inconvenience of depending upon a distant supply, with no 
means to deal with emergency needs, and branding Zeniya's proposal as a 
paper scheme overlooking present and future difficulties. 50) 
The outcome was in doubt and Zeniya expressed pessimism, but the 
decision finally came in his favor, not because the authorities decided it 
would profit the people, and not primarily because it promised more benefit 
to the han finances,but, according to Endo, simply because the pro-Zeniya 
party was larger among the officials due ultimately to Zeniya's greater finan-
cial power.51 ) The result was, as might have been predicted, no great triumph 
for free trade. Zeniya soon came to monopolize the entire candle trade of 
the three provinces.") 
In this conflict Zeniya earned the hatred and fear of the entrenched 
guilds, and he even stepped on the toe of one of his colleagues. Kubo Kihei 
;7.1**,~oo, another Kaga merchant, acted as a go-between for Zeniya, wrote 
the memorial for him, and contributed 500 ryo towards the proposed special 
candle guild. When the result was in their favor, he expected Zeniya to 
share profits with him. After a long silence, he asked Zeniya about how the 
business was going, and Zeniya replied that he had been silent because the 
business was running at a loss, and that he had only refrained from asking 
Kubo to contribute more capital. Kubo was suspicious and procured 
information from one of Zeniya's employees that the enterprise was making 
a fair profit. Kubo then brought the matter to litigation, whereupon Zeniya 
offered as evidence records which showed a steady loss. Kubo attacked the 
records as having been falsified, but lost the suit. Endo concludes that 
47) EndD. 166. 
4B) Ibid., 166, 169. 
49) Ibid., 50, 174. 
50) Ibid., 2B6-90. 
51) Ibid.} 291. Endo believes bribes may have been used by Zeniya, distributed by go. be .. 
tweens. Ibid. 
52) Ibid. 
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the records were III fact falsified, but points out also that Kubo's figures 
were fixed in his own favor. Litigation of this kind added to the suspicion 
of Zeniya's methods and contributed to his fal!.") 
Zeniya died at the age of 80 after a few weeks in prison, presumably 
from old age and shock, awaiting trial on a rather strange charge, namely, 
that he had been responsible for the poisoning of fish which in turn poisoned 
some people, some of whom died. It all began when his third (and favorite) 
son, Y6z6, a chip off the old block, conceived a grandiose scheme of draining 
a large marshy lake near Miyakoshi to reclaim the land for agriculture. It 
was a difficult engineering problem, but Zeniya approved the plan and 
quickly gained the assent of Maeda, Tosa no Kami, a high official of the 
han.") Formal permission was gained in 1851 despite considerable opposition 
from the fishermen who fished on the lake. Y6z6 immediately went to work, 
hiring coolies to dig a large drainage ditch, but had quarrels with fishermen 
who broke the timbers being used for the ditch as they stood on them to 
catch fish which, attracted by the new timbers in the water, swarmed around 
the ditch. Y6z6 replied to this by having lime, coal and oil thrown into 
the water to keep the fish away. One morning the fishermen found a large 
number of fish lying on top of the water, and "joyous at having such a 
big catch ", quickly gathered them up and sold them in Miyakoshi.") The 
unfortunate people who ate the fish became desperately ill, with vomiting 
and diarrhea, and some even died. The result was a great cry against Ze-
niya in which his enemies joined with gusto, and the han authorities arrested 
him and his three sons.'O) The incident furnished them with a good pretext 
to confiscate Zeniya's wealth in Kaga. It was an excellent haul, estimated 
at 365,800 ryo in gold and silver, numerous treasures and large stocks of 
goods.57 ) 
3. CHINA 
Shipping by water has played a major role in the Chinese economy 
from early times, and the organization and operation of shipping and trading 
53) End6, 292-8. The summary of the incident given here is much compressed. 
54) ShOm, op. cit., 171. 
55) Ibid., 184.6. 
56) Ibid., 171, 187. 
57) Ibid., 232-44. ShafU. is not quite satisfied with this explanation and believes the real 
reason for the arrest and confiscation was another offense which will probably remain a 
seCret to history. 
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enterprises of native boats or "junks"1) as described in 1943 by a Japanese 
authority, seem to have been much the same for centuries. The introduc-
tion of competition from railways and steamships has induced no noticeable 
change in organization and operation. This singular lack of progressive 
development necessitates more of a description than a historical treatment, 
and available material is largely descriptive in nature. 
Junks are generally handed down from one generation to another, as 
long as they last, and usually continue to ply the same routes, preserving, 
according to Koizumi "a geographical existence." In numbers, only about 
2 % to 4 % are found in north China, but these are mostly large coastal 
junks which have played a major role in connecting closed ports.') In the 
south, the coastal junks are far outnumbered by innumerable smaller boats 
plying the rivers, creeks, lakes, and canals. 
Pure shipping enterprises, where shipping services are offered to owners 
of goods, are extremely rare. Owners of goods have little trust in junk 
captains and crews, and are suspicious of junk operators in genera!.') Most 
junks combine shipping and trading. They trade for local specialty goods 
which they sell at other markets, but are always willing to ship goods or 
take on passengers to supplement income. Another common activity is fish-
ing, often combined with trading in other commodities.') 
Of the total of junk enterprises, only about l/lOth are individual enter-
prises, with a single owner who has usually one small boat or sometimes 
two, and who acts as captain. The other 9/10ths are plural enterprises in 
two senses: ownership and number of boats owned.') The plural enterprises 
are owned by a number of shareholders whose names are not usually made 
public. They employ a man who has thorough knowledge and experience 
in this type of business and give him complete responsibility as captain for 
each flotilla of two or three boats or, when they operate singly, for each 
boat.') In the selection of these captains, family or close neighborhood 
1)' Koizumi TeizQ /J'\N.~=', i,q his article, "Shina Minsen no Keiei ni Tsuite ~m.s!:;Mi'? 
J\'I:""~ff,tv'c" [On the Operation of Chinese Junks], Keizai Romo J\'I:ii"rilliiillll57, 3 (Sept. 
1943). 66-92, uses the term" minsen ", literally "people's boats ", which he defines as II an 
types of native craft propelled by sail, oar, water buffalo or man power", and also uses 
the "foreign" term H junk" as a rough equivalent, which I have adopted. There is next 
to nothing in English on this subject, but there is a fairly extensive literature on Chinese 
water transportation in Japanese. Koizumi's article summarizes this literature very well. 
2) Ibid., 75, quoting o/;jt;jiJj:ljl, "l3!;!Jl'i'i""" l3!;if<}"'i'l';'l!t," ,",,~o$i:, #12, p. 25. . 
3) Ibid., 79 
4) Ibid •• 80 
5) Ibid., 80-81 
6) Ibid., 81, citing <!'~o!ttii:<;U%~, p. 267. 
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relationships enter wherever possible, as shareholders trust friends or members 
of their own families. Crews are usually recruited from home villagers, with 
the tie of common origin making them more amenable to contro!.7) 
Even the plural enterprises are comparatively small, operating generally 
ten or more boats of medium or large size. Their boats are usually iden-
tifiable as they are often marked with a lucky character or characters, 
whereas individually owned boats are usually marked with the owner's name, 
although in some cases the boats of a plural enterprise are marked with 
the name of the chief shareholder. B) 
In the case of the individual owner-captain, he has the responsibility 
for buying and selling, making shipping arrangements, and often for fishing 
as well. In north China, he does not usually carry his family with him, 
but has them working on a farm. One reason for this is the danger at sea, 
since junks in the north are mostly coastwise. In the south it is usual for 
the family to live aboard individually-owned boats, as they are almost all 
on inland waters.') 
Distribution of profits lO) in the individual enterprise is simple, but for 
the plural enterprise it is on a percentage or commission basis. Profits are 
the remainder from total income after food costs of the crew are paid, and 
are distributed, for example, 70% to the owners, 30% to the crew, or per-
haps 50% and 50%. Then, the owners must dispense from their share 
enough to cover boat maintenance and improvements. In cases where the 
sea lanes are dangerous and where more skill is required in operation, the 
crew's share tends to be greater. Food expenses are not calculated in advance 
but are simply paid out as needed. It is possible, when funds are used in 
a manner unjust to the crew, for the owners not to acknowledge the fact 
and make resitution. However, Koizumi says that in practice, this is unusual, 
since owners and crews are too closely related by ties of family, acquaintance 
or place of origin. 
In regard to the methods of junk operation, Koizumi concludes, "It 
cannot be denied that the operation of junks, the organization of plural enterpri-
ses, the formation of employment relations of a family nature, the percentage 
system of profit distribution all have more or less of a feudalistic character 
and fit into an underdeveloped environment.,,!1) 
7) Koizumi. 82 
8) Ibid •• 81 
9) Ibid. 
10) Ibid., 82. from "'~~JlJt'lltt,%'i"., Jl1oMS"';!;E1tW, 253-4. 
11) Ibid. 83. 
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The Japanese made an attempt at organizing junks into a modern 
capitalistic enterprise after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 
1937. The Water Transportation Section of the Huapei ~:jl:. (Japanese Kahoku) 
Transportation Co., Ltd., a Japanese enterprise, bought a fleet of junks and 
began large scale operations. However, they found it extremely difficult to 
control a large number of junks. On a salary basis, crews whose "hearts 
became empty of love for boats "1') often deliberately sabotaged them. On 
one pretext or another they tried to escape work. The enterprise soon be-
came inefficient and uneconomic. The company offered shipping services 
at a fixed rate from harbor to harbor, forming up small groups of junks 
and dispatching them together. However, particularly along the coast, 
schedules were extremely inaccurate due to difficulties of control and depen-
dence upon natural sources of power, and since this resulted in loss of pro-
fits, the enterprise failed.I3l 
In order to understand the organization of Chinese junk trading and 
shipping it is necessary to carry the study one step further and examine the 
junk" hong" IT. The uniquely Chinese junk" hongs" are organs of com-
merce or distribution. They are invariably found in towns and cities situa-
ted on the China seacoast, rivers, canals, creeks, and lakes frequented by 
junks. They are sometimes popularly called" Minch'uan Wenwu" R:IffiFo' 
&: (japanese Minsen Toiya), and they participate in a large number of acti-
vities, including gathering and selling stocks of local specialty products to 
junk operators, storing and selling such goods on commission, acting as 
warehousers, managing shipping, clearing goods through customs, handling 
liaison with officials, keeping lodging facilities, and, in one case (which will 
be dealt with later) making arrangements akin to marine insurance. 1<) 
Almost all "hongs" are plural enterprises in ownership and manage-
ment. Capitalization ranges from an average of 30,000-50,000 yuan Jt to a 
maximum of 500,000 yuan, with from 10 to 20 or 30 employees. In Che-
chiang, shipping" hongs" are called "kuo tang hang" )j!!r,gi'T. In 1927 
there were 80 to 90 of them at Chakow and about 20 at Hushu, each doing 
$ 10,000 to $ 90,000 worth of business a year, the average being S 50,000, 
"according to the estimate of the kuo tang hang guild."IO) The general 
impression of junk "hongs" is one of large numbers and small size. 
12) Koizumi. 83. 
13) Ibid., citing JiOllJJt;Z.B)h 3tJJII.&it""ff,EII\1iIlB, II, 584. 
14) Ibid" B4, B9, 
J 5) Ibid., 84, citing JiO'RJ'Jt ;Z.jI)], op. cit., 584. 
16) Anonymous," Means of Communication of Chekiang", Chinese Economic Journal, I (Jan. 
1927), 123. 
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The prototype of the junk "hong" was called the "yahong" 7fj'T.17J 
They were organized. only with official permission, as officially-approved 
brokerage houses, and existed in every trading center. They served as tax 
collecting offices, held an absolute power of control over the local markets, 
and could raise market prices at the behest of the government. The present 
junk "hongs" generally resemble their prototypes/B) but the question arises 
as to how they came into existence as organs of commerce and distribution, 
and why they are still necessary to the large part of junk shipping in China. 
Among the innumerable operators of junks, some no doubt have had 
sufficient knowledge of the quality of all the various local products, methods 
of sale, differences in currency exchange, weights and measures, etc., and 
could manage their trade with skill. But this has never been an easy task. 
Moreover, different from steamship lines, junk operators have no offices 
and, without local help, would encounter much difficulty in finding goods 
for purchase and shipment. Also, being in transit most of the time and 
away from the markets, they would have no means to know market conditions 
and would lose through necessarily hurried buying.") It is natural that they 
entrust to the "hongs" the handling of transfers of funds, port services 
and customs relations, as well as the gathering of goods for purchase, and 
most junk operators have found it profitable to become dependent upon the 
" hongs ".'0) 
Junk operators, local merchants and the "hongs" are closely inter-related 
and interdependent. But the "hong", due to its central position in trade 
as the go-between, has virtually absolute power.") Rather than being merely 
interdependent, traders and junk operators are really subordinate to the 
" hong". 22) 
It is common for "hongs" to combine the lodging of passengers with 
the warehousing of goods, as was the case with Venetian trading establish-
ments in 12th and 13th century south European ports. The" hong" head-
quarters are usually square stone or brick buildings with a lower floor for 
goods, an upper floor for lodging, and an inner court for trading.") Pro-
17) Koizumi, Ope cit., 85. 
i8) Ibid. 
i9) Ibid., 86, citing J:~gg.=. ~Io~ K~1t Q !i"~!iI!M <0li1f1i:. li';!t-<0W!%":. JjilHll!i!iIcfilgii1flilf1i: I, 
206, 244.9. 
20) Ibid., 85 
21) Ibid., 86 
22) Ibid. 
23) Ibid., 87 
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minent among lodgers are provincial merchants who travel as junk passen' 
gers with their goods with them to sell at markets along the way. They 
arrange their transportation with the "hong" and often gain their confidence 
in time and are used by the "hong" to supervise goods in shipment 
belonging to them and to make purchases and transfers of funds for them.") 
" Hongs" serve as middlemen for shipping and passenger services, and 
store goods both as warehousers and wholesalers. As wholesalers, they at-
tempt to purchase when prices are low and hold until prices are higher.") 
As another important function, the "hongs" act as agents for all arran-
gements between the junk operators and the governmental authorities. Not 
only do they serve as agents for the junk operators with the authori-
ties, but they often maintain contacts with the home organizations of junk 
owners.") As government agents, they handle, for example, reports to the 
government authorities (especially to the official supervising boats), the inspec-
tion of boats, collection and payment of customs duties, government fees, 
and all necessary liaison between operators, owners and government.27 ) 
The "hong" sometimes hire out junks, as distinct from arranging ship-
ment for parcels of goods. Anyone wishing to ship goods by hiring a junk 
must go through a "hong" because if he attempted to hire one himself, he 
would not know the complicated special circumstances, the usual routes 
taken, and the trustworthiness of any particular junk captain and crew.") 
Moreover, if the shipper's goods are not sufficient to load the ship fully or 
are consecutively unloaded at different points, the rate would increase so 
much as to become prohibitive.") 
The question naturally arises, what steps, if any, are taken to protect 
shippers' goods? The" hong" usually stands in the position of middleman 
and guarantor for goods shipped. However, when a shipper hires a junk 
and an accident actually occurs, the "hong" ordinarily will not take 
responsibility for loss. Thus, ultimately, the owner of the goods must take 
what precautions he can. For this reason, the owner often puts aboard one 
of his own men to watch his goods.3D) Also, in cases where the "hong" 
arranges shipment of goods belonging to various regular "hong" customers, 
the "hong" sometimes puts a trusted man aboard as supervisor for the 
24) Koizumi, 90 
25) Ibid., 86.7. In addition, there are cases where" hongs" own and operate their own junks, 
but this seems rare. Ibid., 84 
26) Ibid .• 87 
27) Ibid. 
28) Ibid., 88.9 
29) Ibid., B9 
30) Ibid. 
48 c. D. SHELDON 
goods.3l ) 
In Chechiang, the kuo tang hang (already mentioned) is responsible to the 
owner for any shortage or damage. The junk operator is responsible in 
turn to the "hong". "But in actual practice, losses sustained through any 
unexpected accident are shared equally by the three parties."") 
Only one case has been found in the materials presently available of 
something akin to marine insurance. This is in Tsingtao, where there existed 
in 1943 a system whereby the "hong" took full responsibility for all goods 
loaded, for a fee of 5 yuan per 100 yuan worth of goods.33) 
In internal organization, the "hong" from the first formed a kind of 
group with ties of place of origin and family relationships among shareholders 
and administrators, in a type of self-government seen throughout Chinese 
society.") Koizumi explains that between" hongs" there has been an organi-
zed type of liaison and cooperation with some points of similarity to cartels, 
but essentially different. He says that in some cases this cooperation has 
broken down and competition has become fierce, and adds that "due to 
the impositions of political power, the evils of smuggling are widespread."35) 
From his study Koizumi concludes that the "hong" is an obstacle to 
capital accumulation, and that "Junk enterprises are simply not useful for 
the accumulation of commercial capital."") The methods of junk operation 
are based on familial and provincial relationships, and the organization of 
plural enterprises are feudalistic and undeveloped. The junk enterprises 
themselves are caught between an undeveloped productive system in fishing 
and agriculture and an equally undeveloped organ of trade, the "hong", to 
which they are subordinated.37 ) 
The junk is a means of transportation, but it is used as a means of 
distribution which is subject to commercial capital. In this role it is useful 
31) Koizumi, 84 
32) Anonymous," Means of Communication, etc.", Ope cit., 121-2. 
33) Koizumi, Ope cit., 89 
34) Ibid., 88 
35) Ibid. Cooperation and liaison may have been effected through guilds, at least in some 
cases, but Koizumi is not specific on this point. The term "guild" is used in the article, 
"Means of Communication of Chekiang," cited above. Further in regard to the "ho~gs" 
getting out of control, Koizumi says, "Since 1937 the problem of controlling the" hongs" 
has been pressing, and in north China they are being made to join regular "hong n 
guilds. At present [1943] the Japanese are buying many commodities, using these guilds 
as compradores... Ibid., 88. 
In regard to Koizumi's reference to cartels, he does not say how the liaison and coo-
peration differs from cartels. 
36) Ibid., 90. 
37) Ibid., 92 
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in the replenishment of commercial capital. However, due to the fact that 
it has not yet achieved an independent role, it does nothing to build up 
shipping capital, and its economic function is not specialized.38) 
In order to complete the general picture of Chinese shipping attempted 
here it will be necessary to examine the one important Chinese effort to 
build up modern shipping capital, the Chinese Merchants' Steam Navigation 
Company fiH~8:tRlIIim (usually abbreviated to :tRillim). 
After 1861, when the Yangtze was opened to foreign navigation, Li 
Hung-chang feared it would become a foreign monopoly, and, with Jung 
Hung, pressed for the establishment of a Chinese steamship company, which he 
justified on grounds of national defense.") Conservative officials put up a 
battle, complaining of the excessive cost of steamers, but Li, in a memorial 
of 1872, made a spirited defense of Jung Hung's proposal for a steamship 
line, recommending that a government-subsidized company be formed, and 
his plan finally carried the day.") 
In 1872, with the death of Tseng Kuo-fan, Li was already the foremost 
Chinese official. From 1870 until his death in 1901, he was Viceroy of 
Chihli, Grand Secretary, Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Trade, Superin-
tendent of Northern Trade, and Generalissimo of the Military and Naval 
Forces in the North.") He was a great industrial promoter, cleverly com-
bining personal with national interests. He became the patron of modern 
equipment and many technical innovations, including the Shanghai-Woosung 
Railway, telegraph lines, a cotton mill in Shanghai, the Military Academy 
in Tientsin, as well as the steamship line."') 
Li organized the Chinese Merchants' Steamship Company in 1872, 
after consultation with compradores of Jardine, Matheson and Co. and others, 
with capitalization from "both official sources and private shareholders."") 
Accounts vary in regard to capitalization, but the most accurate source") 
states that with Imperial approval, Li borrowed 200,000 strings of cash from 
38) Koizumi. 92. 
39) Baba ShOtaro !\\~~j.(~~, Shina Keizai Chid Shi (KotJ. Zenhen) JlOlf\f.fli1\J1!!JlI!1!l; (;<il!i~ 
*fi), [A Compilation of Materials on Chinese Economic Geography (Complete Edition on 
Transportation)] (Tokyo: [922), 289. 
40) Artbur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese af the Ch'ing Period (Washington: 1943), 467. 
41) H. B. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China (London, 3rd ed., 1921), 259; J. O. 
P. Bland, Li Hung-chang (London: 1917), 120. 
42) Shih Kuo-heng, in Levy and Shih, The Rise of the Modern Business Class (Kew York; 
1949), 29. 
43) Baba, op. cit., 289. 
44) Suzuki Soichiro if;7"'ifi~:-~~, $fJJ!iIJ!lot' iffiifij};lj=o:i;:llsJ [Li Ku-fan's The Official Investi_ 
gations of the Chinese Merchants' Steam Kavigation Company], Kei::.ai Ronso, 54, 3 (Sept. 
[940), 117-124. 
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the Chihli military subsistence funds and 50,000 taels from private sources."') 
According to another authority,") "a large part of the company's stock was 
owned by Li, as was the case with most of the enterprises he sponsored." 
This apparent conflict of fact may very well be explained by Li's biogra-
pher,") who points out that Li made almost no distinction between what 
we would call public funds and his own private treasury. Moreover, his 
army was so nearly a personal one that he often used subsistence funds for 
other purposes, forcing his soldiers to wait for their pay. This was one of 
the points of conflict between him and General Gordon.'S) 
The company began operations with one ship, the Aden, which was 
the first commercial steamer under Chinese control. 49) At first the Aden was 
used to link closed ports. However, at this time the Nanking canal was 
cutoff and great difficulty was experienced in getting tax rice to Peking 
from the south.") Therefore, in 1874, with the aid of official funds from 
Chiangsu and Chechiang, the company was reorganized on a larger scale, 
still on a semi-official basis. The first object of the company was to per-
mit an independent development of shipping enterprise by means of Chinese 
capital, and to break into the foreign monopoly of modern means of ship-
ping.51 ) To this was now added a second object, to protect the privileges 
of tribute rice shipments along the coast from the Yangtze to north China,") 
and deprive the foreign powers of an important potential lever on the Chi-
nese government. 
In 1862 an American firm, Russell and Company, had formed the Shang-
hai Union Steam Navigation Co. ~@l1$1l', with a capitalization of one mil-
lion yuan. They attempted a form of cooperative enterprise with American 
and Chinese participation which never proved to be very profitable. When, 
after a number of years of difficulty, it began to show a profit, capitalization 
was increased to 2,200,000 yuan, and the number of steamships increased 
to eighteen.53) In 1877, the Chinese Merchants Steam Navigation Company 
was able to buyout the American company's Chinese enterprise, including 
45) Suzuki, 117. 
46) Hummel, op. cit., 467 
47) Bland, op. cit., 120-1. 
4H) Ibid., 224. Burgevine went over to the T'ai P'ings, according to Bland, after similar 
quarrels over LPs evasion of payment to his troops. 
49) Baba, op. cit., 289. 
50) Ibid. The reason, not given by Saba, Was probably silting. 
51) Suzuki,op. cit., 117. 
52) Ibid. 
53) Baba, op. cit., 289-90. 
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its Shanghai docking facilities.") The Chinese company increased its capi-
talization to 2 million taels m by 1882 through recruiting capital from private 
Chinese sources.55) Runs were established not only between southern and 
northern ports, but also to Japan, the Philippines and Singapore.56) 
Li, as Superintendent of Northern Trade, secured a monopoly of freights 
for tribute rice and other government supplies for the company, making it 
"a milch cow of extraordinary productivity and, despite wholesale pecula-
tion, [it] continued to show large profits for many years.''''' Also, using 
his official position, Li prevailed upon Peking to prevent the Governor of 
Formosa and other Chinese shipping owners from competing with his steam-
ers in the Yangtze trade. 58) 
During the hostilities with France over Annam in 1885, Li protected 
his ships from French seizure by selling them to Russell and Company who 
operated them under American flags, "with a verbal understanding that 
they might be repurchased after the danger of capture was over."") The 
same year he bought them back and appointed Sheng Hsiian-huai Jilt1L~ 
(1849-1916) to reorganize the company and to manage it.'") 
Sheng was one of the first of the major Chinese industrial managers, 
as distinct from industrial promoters such as Li. He was also the first 
official in Chinese history whose official position was not only secondary to, 
but actually dependent upon, his role as an industrial manager. He was 
born in Chiangsu of an official family and passed the Chu Jen degree, but 
gave up after several attempts at the Chin Shih degree. He joined Li 
Hung-chang's secretarial staff and gained a reputation first in relief work 
and then in supervision of railway construction under Li. He became very 
active in Li's industrial projects.61) 
One of the most striking facts of Sheng's enterprises was their continued 
increases in capitalization. Capitalization of the Chinese Merchants' Steam 
Navigation Company, two million taels in 1882, doubled by 1898,62) and 
and doubled again by 1912 when, "thrown into the vortex of political 
controversy, it formed a holding company with capital holdings of eight 
54) Baba, 290. 
55) Suzuki, 117. I have been unable to find the relationship between taels and yuan for that 
date. 
56) Hummel. op. c;/., 467. 
57) Ibid., 46B. 
58) Bland, op. d/., 120. 
59) Hummel, op. cit., 46B. 
60) Shih, Ope cit., 31 ; Suzuki, Ope cit., 120. 
61) Shih, Ope cit., 30-1, gives this biographical information. 
62) Suzuki, op. cit.. 117; Baba, 290. 
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million yuan, for the purpose of reorganization."") However, due to conflicts 
within the holding company, no real reorganization was achieved, although 
the operation had not been satisfactory from its beginning."') By 1927, 
capitalization had reached the tremendous total of over a billion taels.65) 
However, despite such an increase in capital indebtedness, there was 
no development of the enterprise itself. The number of ships owned and 
the scheduled number of runs remained almost stationary."') As a business 
enterprise it was stagnant, and every sign points to a steady drain of capital 
into operational expenses (including dividends, to keep up an increase in capi-
tal). In this regard, a Japanese authority writes, "The enterprises of Sheng 
Hsuan-huai continued to have an outward appearance of prosperity even 
after his death [in 1916], but due to defects in organization and administra-
tion, they were like old trees eaten out by termites, and their real condition, 
when finally revealed, surprised foreigners and Chinese alike."57) Sheng must 
have known a day of reckoning would be inevitable, and his reputed 
cleverness must be given its due credit for putting off the evil day until 
long after his death. 
The evil day finally carne in 1927, when the newly powerful Kuomin-
tang regime ordered a full investigation, in part due to mounting criticism 
of the company by shareholders who suspected corruption and chaotic con-
ditions.6B) As a result of the investigation, "the direct causes of the failure of 
the enterprise became clear, and the company was completely reorganized 
and nationalized in 1932."69) 
The following year, 1933, Li Ku-fan :$fJilrpj[, an able member of the 
investigating body, published a book, Chao Shang Chu San Ta An mililPol:::::t:~, 
incorporating the official report of the investigation and including proposals 
for reform.") The publication of this book must be recognized as a remark-
able example of Chinese self-criticism. Li's purpose in publishing the book 
was to educate and invoke public opinion to make the reform of the company 
63) Baha, 290. 
64) Ibid. 
65) Suzuki, oft. cit., 117. 
66) Ibid. 
67) Tachihana Kiji lilitlt, Shina Shakai Kenkyu ><JlI\*±~j;}f')\'; [A Study of Chinese Societyl 
(Tokyo: 8th ed., 1940), 200. Shih, op. cit., 33, says, "Sheng ... failed ... not because of any 
weakness in management, but rather because his managerial role was confused with poli~ 
tics." This is misleading, because Sheng'S managerial role was never meant by him to be 
a successful one for the enterprise. but only for himself, as we will see. 
68) Suzuki, op. cie., 118. 
69) Ibid. 
70) Ibid. 
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permanent and to improve Chinese society.") According to Suzuki, Li's 
book is a scientific, accurate statistical study which "permits for the first 
time a view of the inner workings of a Chinese business and its official 
connections, kept secret in the past."72l Its importance in the study of 
modern Chinese society is well expressed in the first words of the book, 
"The problem of the Chinese Merchants' Steam Navigation Company is 
the reduced shadow of the entire problem of China." 
In 1880 an attempt was made to make the company an entirely private 
enterprise by paying back its official capital.73l However, when Sheng Hsiian-
huai reorganized it in 1885, it took fixed form as a semi-official company 
with oversubscription Df bureaucratic capital.") There is no doubt that it 
was difficult to increase capitalization entirely through the sale of stock to 
individual merchants. Sheng himself complained of this, writing that "As 
for rich merchants, they know how to protect themselves. They prefer to 
set up their own private business than to join big firms. In so doing, gain-
ing or losing, they are responsible to themselves. On the other hand, they 
refuse to become shareholders in order to avoid being identified with the 
rich and being involved in any unexpected trouble."75) The 1885 reorganiza-
tion was carried out in accordance with regulations formulated by Sheng; 
in which he justifies bureaucratic capital and official supervision: " Without 
commercial effort, one cannot hope for profit; without official supervision, 
one cannot avoid corruption."76) It is difficult to imagine that this pious 
statement was taken seriously, because in fact, subsidization and "official 
supervision" served as excellent means for Sheng to enrich himself.77l The 
company was a mixture of the old type Chinese yamen and the compradore 
system,") and Tachibana characterizes this form of enterprise with overcapi-
talization from official sources as the" Sheng Hsiian·huai type or the Liang 
71) Suzuki, 118~9. Li, p. 5, lists his reasons as follows: 
(1) To assist the future adjustment and reform of the company, as the government had 
already decided to nationalize it. 
(2) To make it an object lesson for the improvement of Chinese society by stimulating 
a correct view towards official corruption on the part of society. 
(3) To make known the methodology utilized in the hope that it would be widely 
used in the future as a means of supervision as well as investigation.· . 
72) Ibid., 119.120. 73) Baba, op. cit., 290. 74) Suzuki, op. cit., 120. 
75) Shih, op. cie., 38 quoting Yu-chai ts'un-kao [Collected Drafts of Sheng Yu~chai], chuan 77, 
p. 22. In regard to official participation in business, Sheng adds, "The scholars regard 
commercial affairs as more difficult than government office. Consequently, all the talented, 
clever people choose to seek an official career ... Therefore, those who enter into business 
neither are qualified for office or commerce nor have knowledge or money." This is the 
very situation which Sheng exploited to tbe full. 
76) Suzuki, op. cit., 121. 77) Ibid. 
78) Ibid .. quoting Li Ku.fan, p. I. 
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Shih-yi ~±iiii' type", as opposed to the type of Chang Chien 'lR-1'If, who used 
only private capital and strove, with real Confucian sincerity, for the success 
of the enterprise rather than for his own enrichment,") 
Sheng constantly extended his political and economic power, with the 
steamship line as his major sphere of influence, under Li's protection. He 
gave important company positions to innumerable relatives and old cronies, 
almost transforming it into his own private property.80) 
In addition to the office in Shanghai, the company maintained major 
branch offices in Tientsin and Hankow. Li Ku-fan's investigation of these 
branch offices was particularly revealing, and Suzuki deals primarily with 
the Hankow branch,' as representative of the company's operations. In the 
branch offices, there was a type of double entry system, but entirely foreign 
to the usual sense of the term. Two journals were kept. One was the 
journal for use in reporting to the main office, the other was the private 
journal kept secretly by the branch office head.") The existence of these 
two journals was a basic requirement of the rather strange ch'ing fu iili':tr! 
system, under which branch offices acted as contractors, and the branch 
employees were not paid by the head office.") One is reminded of the tax 
farming system in pre-British India, or, perhaps more closely, Chinese pro-
vincial officials in periods of weak central government working more for 
themselves than for the government in the collection of taxes, but finding 
it necessary to preserve an appearance of rectitude. 
The most ingenious methods were used to give an aura of legality and 
respectability to the ill-gotten gains of the branch office heads. One was 
the use of differences in conversion rates. The official conversion rate of 
silver cash to silver taels from 1911 to 1921, for example, was always 0.68. 
However, the money exchange in Hankow during this period fluctuated from 
0.3585 to 0.55. The difference in conversion on the books was 210,000 
taels for the period 1911 to 1925, a sum illegally acquired by the branch 
office manager who could, however, argue that he had used the official 
conversion rate.") 
Another source of gain was found in the payment of expenses. One 
of the chief expense items at Hankow was the purchase of coal. Coal was 
79) Tachibana, Ope cit., 200, Liang Shih-yi was to Yiian Shih-k'ai what Sheng was to Li 
Hung-chang, his" arne damnie", as Bland puts it, in his biography of Li, p. 122. 
Chang Chien condemned officials as industrial operators, saying, very accurately, that 
they" promoted industry in name but handicapped it in fact." Shih, Ope cit., 44. 
80) Suzuki, op. cit., 120. 
Bl) Ibid" 121. Li Ku-fan did not succeed in seizing the secret journal but found incontest-
able proof of its existence. 
82) Ibid. 83) Ibid" 121-2. 
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generally purchased from a large monopolistic company under contract.") 
In Hankow, only a very small additional amount was purchased from small 
Hankow dealers. However, according to the public journal, the Hankow 
delivered price was generally higher than the Hankow market price. In 
the seven years 1916-1923 it averaged 34 taels per ton higher on the books, 
and the total difference due to this price differential totaled 489,641 taels 
for this seven year period, a nice profit for the branch head.85) 
In addition to this, the amount of coal purchased as recorded in the 
public journal was raised about one tenth, making a difference of more than 
330,000 taels for the period 1911-1926.85) This is not all. In connection 
with the expenditure for coal, the expense of loading was recorded as 2 Yo 
ch'ien~, whereas in reality it was only 1 ch'ien. In the period 1911-1926, 
the total from this difference reached 56,000 taels87) Li Ku-fan concludes 
that" For corruption on such a scale to be possible, there was no method 
other than for the Hankow branch head to have gained the assent of the 
executives of the head office."") 
Soon after the organization of the company, a commission of 5 % was 
offered the branch offices on freight collected above a stipulated amount. 
This was to stimulate business, as is the purpose of commissions. However, 
under the Sheng system, and until 1924, although business increased, the 
stipulated amount above which commissions were paid was left the' same. 
In 1924, for Hankow, it was increased 50,000 tae1s, to a total of 425,000 
taels, still well below the average amount of business. By keeping the base 
figure down, the branch head could count ona regular addition to his 
income. Total commissions for the period 1912-1925 equaled 180,000 tae1s.89) 
But the largest addition to the private income of the branch head was 
income from real property. Half the real property owned by the company 
was used in the operation of the business, but half was rented out. The 
total investment in this real property was 1,020,000 taels which, applying 
the usual rate of return in Hankow, 10%, would have brought in more 
than 100,000 taels a year. However, as recorded in the public journal, ,the 
income ranged from only 970 taels in 1912 to only 17,000 taels, in 1924, 
the highest amount recorded. Using this means of estimation, the loss to 
the company from 1911 to 1927 was about 1,300,000 taels.90) 
The Tientsin and other office heads as well, used similar means to en-
84) 'Ibid., 122. Bland, op. cit., 121, points out that Li's coal mine, ,upplied cheap eoal for 
his shipping line. 
85) Suzuki, 122. 86) Ibid. 
87) Ibid. 
88) Li, p. 17, quoted in ibid. 69) Ibid., 122·3. 
90) Ibid., 123. 
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rich themselves at the expense of the business, and the total deficit for the 
period 1921 to 1926 was about 4,370,000 taels.OI) 
Shih Tzu-ch'ing 1i(jj~*g~ was the lucky man to be appointed head of the 
Hankow office in 1893. Sheng had by this time grasped full control of the 
company, and Shih, who was a good friend of Sheng, emulated him by 
making the Hankow office a personal and even hereditary enterprise.") 
A modern enterprise is one in which there are impersonal contractual 
obligations which are binding in fact upon the parties. Business management 
is responsible not only to present but also to future shareholders as owners 
of the business. It is their purpose to plan for its success on the basis of 
predictable income and expenditures, and to achieve their own economic 
success by means of the success of the enterprise. If these points may be 
used as criteria, the Chinese Merchants' Steam Navigation Company can by 
no means be called a modern business. I t was organized not to become a 
success, but to make its organizers wealthy. 
It remains to see how the indigenous junk enterprises have been affec-
ted by railroad and steamship competition. Amano Gennosuke, an authority 
in Chinese agricultural economics, points out that the railroads have felt 
very strongly the competition of junks on inland waterways, even for short 
hauls.") This is in large part because of extremely high railway freight 
rates for the standard of Chinese economics. These high rates have been 
due to economically irrational building, corruption in railroad management, 
losses in freight cars and other equipment, depradations of warlords added 
to poor connections, differences in gauge, bad safety, and many other 
causes.") Railway freight rates have ranged from 2 to 9 times the junk 
rates, and there have been many cases where, strangely enough, the junks 
have moved commodities with greater speed than the inefficient railroads.") 
When comparing steamships with junks, there is a geographical factor 
to be considered. Baba has estimated that in 1921 there were about 27,000 
Chinese miles of waterways in China accessible to steam vessels of small, 
medium, and large size, but, in addition, 33,600 Chinese miles of waterways 
accessible only to junks."') But junks have not retreated to their shallow 
creeks, rivers, canals and lakes. They have continued on the larger water-
ways as well. Wittfogel, commenting on the article in the Chinese Economic 
Journal on "Means of Communication of Chekiang ", cited above, says, 
"The penetration of the steamship dealt a blow to Chinese water com-
91) Suzuki, 123.4, citing fnIf4>;Z, 'l'CiNi±4dil\iI\'/lIHI\', 108. 92) Ibid., 124. 
93) Koizumi, op. cit., 71, citing Amano', RJJI\;!il~;Iil\lIf~, II, 454.5. 
94) Ibid., 73 95) Ibid., 74 
96) In Shina KeiZai Chiri Shi, op. cit" 175. A Chinese mile is about 1 J1' English miles. 
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munications, particularly to sea communications, but to inland waterway 
communications as well. But despite this, old type shipping enterprises 
have persisted against machine competition, like other old ways in other 
fields of endeavor, and have strongly protected themselves ... Even in 1927, 
in the province most closely associated with Shanghai and other half-modern-
ized ports, the income of old type transportation enterprises far exceeded 
that of the modern transportation companies of the province."97) But a 
Chinese authority, T'ang Hsiung-chieh !l!fPit&;t, goes much further, writing 
that "Not only were the old type junks not elbowed out, they actually 
strengthened their position."") 
In the early days of the Chinese Merchants' Steam Navigation Company 
at least, merchants suspected it as a governmental rather than economic 
organization and as the possessor of arbitrary power. In 1878 a Chiangsu 
merchant refused to use the Chinese company to ship his goods, and it was 
revealed later that he was afraid the Chinese government would tax him irre-
gularly, based on the value of the goods shipped on the Chinese line.99) 
This merchant, and no doubt many more, preferred to use native junks or 
foreign steamships, but this feeling may have been overcome in time. The 
real reason for the extraordinary staying power of the native junks is more 
basic. The predominance of small scale traders and great local differences 
in market conditions must have combined to give the junks, despite their 
inefficiency and relatively high rates, the edge over steamships as organs of 
distribution. Small parcels of local specialty goods could be sold, with the 
aid of the "hongs", at those market centers where prices were highest. 
The striking fact of Chinese water transportation up to recent years is 
the triumph of the old. What Tachibana calls the "anti-capitalism of the 
Chinese official class and their medieval attitude "IOO) was enough to swamp 
the steamship company in time. Li and Sheng found in monopolistic 
enterprises like the steamship line, organized in the form of a European 
joint-stock company, a new means to an old end. The end of self-enrichment 
by official participation in economic enterprises seen in earlier dynasties had 
become almost institutionalized in practice by the nineteenth century. I twas 
achieved by the exploitation of monopolies won by political influence or by 
purchase. These were traditional state monopolies like the salt monopoly 
or trade monopolies like that of the Ch'ung-wen gate of Peking, exploited by 
such experts as Ho Shen f.~;E'" (1750-1799),''') and the well-known Canton 
97) Koizumi, OPt cit., 70-71. Koizumi does not indicate where this comment is to be found. 
This is therefore my translation of the Japanese translation of Wittfogel's remarks. 
98) Ibid., 71, dting xiili~Ji$ y, 5, 6, 7. 99) Shib, op. cit., 38. 
100) In his Shina Shakai Kenkyu, op. cit., 208. 
101) cr. Hummel, op. cit., 288.290 
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foreign trade. The art was to stop just short of the point beyond which the 
traders would be driven out of business. The joint-stock company offered 
an even more lucrative source of wealth in the short run by adding private 
investment funds to the siphoning off of government funds. But there was 
a correspondingly stronger attitude of "apres moi, le deluge", since managers 
like Sheng knew that dividends would reach a point where they could not 
be met, and private investors would demand an accounting. 
This unfortunate experience of the steamship company, coupled with 
the disastrous Japanese attempt to organize a large-scale junk enterprise along 
modern lines, serves to vindicate, in a way, the conservatism, whether volun-
tary or involuntary, of the junk enterprisers who have continued to make 
money in the same small, inconspicuous way as their ancestors. At the same 
time, such unsuccessful attempts underline the almost insuperable difficulties 
of change to a modern capitalistic economy in China. 
4. CONCLUSION: APRELIMINARY COMPARISONll 
In Japanese "pre-modern" shipping enterprises, the following factors, 
not always fully developed, can be distinguished: 
I) Large size enterprises, growing with the expansion of the money 
economy and the breaking down of feudal barriers. 
2) Accumulation of commercial capital on a large scale. 
3) Specialization of economic function, e.g., as in the shipping business 
of the Higaki Kaisen. 
4) The new organization of large merchant alliances for the regulariza-
tion and monopolization of commerce in specific goods and services. 
5) The advantage of prevalent standards in currency, weights and 
1) The word" preliminary" is used advisedly. There is much work left to be done on this 
problem, and little exists in western languages. In addition to Wittfogel's writings in Ger. 
man, his article, "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History," Zeitschrijt 
fiir SozialJorschung IV (1935), 26.60, is helpful in understanding Chinese economic history. 
See especially his long and suggestive note on the last page comparing the Japanese and 
Chinese economies. Wittfogel stresses the far greater role of public works in China, as an 
explanation of official control of the economy. 
A general interpretative survey by an acknowledged authority can be found in John E. 
Orchard, "Contrasts in the Progress of Industrialization in China and Japan," Political 
Science Quarterly, M~rch 1937, 18.50.. This covers Meiji Japan and contemporary China, 
and is a helpful introduction, from western sources. 
E. Herbert Norman, in his excellent study of Meiji Japan, Japan's Emergence as a Modern 
State (New York: 1940.), footnote, pages 32-3, summerizes Kuo Mo~jo's analysis of China's 
failure and Japan's success at modernization, which has much interest, but is marred 
somewhat by Kuo's intense antipathy for the Manchu dynasty and his tendency to over-
stress the progressive nature of the intellectual movement which the Manchus suppressed. 
JAPANESE AND CHINESE MODERNIZATION 59 
measures. 
6) A large degree of trust as seen in the entrusting of goods to ship-
pers not only for shipment to distant points but even for sale at distant 
markets, and as seen in Zeniya's trust in his agents, not related to him by 
family or, in many cases, by place of origin. 
7) In the course of regular business among producers, shippers and 
retailers, the widespread use of contracts which stimulated the desire to 
satisfy in order to obtain future business. 
8) The absence of pirates. 
The absence of other hazards left two major dangers to shippers and traders 
by water: natural dangers to navigation (reefs, shoals, and bad weather) and 
officials. But we have seen how the hansen system fostered skill and efficiency 
in navigation, and how a type of marine insurance was evolved. As for 
the officials, they wielded, of course, arbitrary power which often militated 
against capitalistic progress, but they seldom soiled their hands with filthy 
merchant lucre without having some moral justification for any really spec-
tacular confiscations, and merchants simply had to be careful. 
Political and military considerations built the teeming city of Edo, which 
became extremely dependent economically on the merchants. This gave them 
potential power of a type not seen in China, and Edo's position as a center 
of consumption contributed to the development of economic specialization, 
as did the continued growth of Dsaka as a production and collection center. 
The sankin kiitai system brought the daimyii into a dependence upon the 
merchants similar to that of the hakufu in Edo. The feudal ruling classes, 
unlike the official class in China, had no tradition of close relationship with 
merchants entailing the understanding of trade and how to use it for their 
own purposes. They were lost in an unfamiliar and extremely complex 
money economy which they deplored as beneath them, but which they were 
instrumental in creating, and upon which they were increasingly dependent. 
However, in our enthusiasm for the "progressive" nature of commerce 
in pre-modern Japan, we must not lose track of the fact that most com-
mercial capital accumulation was made possible by connections with the feu-
dal ruling classes which meant that the merchant class was tied fairly close· 
ly to the old order.') But we have shown in this study that these ties could 
be severed and replaced by a new and vigorous type of enterpriser like Zeniya 
whose own ties with the authorities were close, but not complete, and who 
2) Horie Yasuz6, Nihon Kei?aishi S;$:f.EiI'ill! [An Economic History of Japan]. 184. John 
w. Hall, in '~The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Class", Occasional Papers, Center 
for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, No.1 (1951), 26-33, lays perhaps too much 
stress on the feudal bonds of the merchants. 
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was remarkably free to graze in many new and promISIng pastures either by 
breaking down old fences or by merely finding new unfenced and unexploited 
fields such as the Hokkaido trade. Perhaps the most basic difference from 
China was that all the Chinese economic fences were built perhaps by the 
time of the golden days of the T'ang dynasty and jealously guarded by 
gentry-officials whose economic techniques were refined by centuries of exper-
ience. 
Application to the Chinese economic scene of the eight points numbered 
above will show that none of these factors existed there, and that the uncer-
tainties involved in any attempt to build up large capitalistic shipping 
or trading enterprises were truly formidable. There was no standardization 
of currency, weights and measures; local exchanges showed great variations;') 
piracy was notorious, and what might be called "official piracy", that of 
bureaucrats and warlords, made the non-official enterpriser fear not only the 
appearance of any large-scale commercial success but even the attainment 
of it. Officials like Li Hung.chang and Sheng Hsiian·huai, as we have seen, 
could operate on a large scale, but their "success" was not the success of 
their enterprises. The lack of mutual trust among Chinese merchants and 
shippers has been demonstrated several times, and is one reason for the small 
family-type enterprise so common in China. The junk enterpriser, as we have 
shown, was caught between a rather stable, unchanging production system 
and the semi-official "hong", and had little chance, in such uncertain eco-
nomic conditions, to display any independence_ In" pre-modern" Japan, 
the ruling classes in a society which despite them was undergoing profound 
change, had little success in either discouraging commercial capital or in 
utilizing it. In China, the official class had remarkable success in discoura-
ging it by the very fact that they utilized it so well, for their own enrich-
ment. This was not essentially changed, moreover, by the introduction of 
such western techniques as the steamship and the western joint-stock company 
On the contrary, these new techniques offered the officials merely new and 
interesting variations in achieving the traditional and very personal economic 
self-aggrandizement which, in turn, led to increased political power. 
3) In Japan, there were only two controling money exchanges, Osaka, which established the 
silver ratios for all of Japan, and Edo, which set the official copper ratios, all in termS of 
gold which was fixed. It was a system of "parallel relations"~ with only minor fluctua-
tions. cr. Charles D. Sheldon, Monetary Problems of Seventeenth Century Japan (Unpublished 
Master's Thesis, Univ. of Calif., 1951), 33-4. See also the excellent short article by Prof. 
Rorie in NKJ. 366-8, on specie relationships. 
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